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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from a conditional plea under I.C.R. 11. The state alleged that the
defendant had driven under the influence and without privileges. The Magistrate Court heard
argument and found that it would not prejudice the defendant to have a joint trial on both charges
because a jury would not find her guilty of the one due to the other. Further, the Court heard
argument on whether the state had violated the defendant's right to Due Process and Effective
Assistance of Counsel by not reviewing certain evidence or providing it to the defendant. The
Court denied the motion to compel. The defendant also moved to have the breath test result
excluded at trial because the state was in violation ofl.C. § 18-8004(4) but the Court found that
the issue had to be resolved at trial. The defendant then entered a conditional plea of guilty to
both charges while reserving her right to appeal the Court's rulings and the Court found her
guilty. At the sentencing, the defendant sought to withdraw her plea based on a recently decided
case in the United States Supreme Court, and the Court denied the motion. The defendant timely
appealed
At an appeals hearing before the District Court, the Court heard argument and affirmed
the Magistrate Court.
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B.

Course of Proceedings & Statement of Facts

On January 10, 2013, the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence and
without privileges by Officer Neal of the Coeur d'Alene Police Department. Tr. p. 22, 36.
On March 14, 2013, the Magistrate Court of Kootenai County held a hearing on the
defendant's Motion to Sever. Tr. p. 1, L. 11. After hearing argument and reviewing the
defendant's motion, the Court found the following:
THE COURT: In this case, as Miss Tinkeyl has pointed out, the ticket were issued on the
same day, arose out of the same incident, same driving conduct.
And so, I'm going to exercise my discretion and leave the matter set for trial.
I don't think that joining a driving without privileges charge with a DUI charge is gonna
result in any due prejudice in the ability of the defense to defend either one of those
charges in the presence of the jury. I don't - the jury will be instructed to consider each
count separately and the nature of each one of those charges are such that isn't going to
really cause them, if they find a conviction on one charge, to automatically impose a
conviction on another charge.
Tr. p. 2, L. 11-24.
The Court then held a hearing on the defendant's Motion to Compel. The Court then
made the following findings:

I Coeur d'Alene City Prosecutor.
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THE COURT: [U]nder Rule 16, the duty of the Prosecutor is to respond to the discovery
requests. And it's a continuing duty to respond to discovery requests that are set forth in
Rule 16.
And here, I went over the items listed in the motion to compel.
I'm aware that there's a local practice here amongst prosecuting agencies where they will
quite often have copies of and provide copies to the defense attorneys of some of those
documents that are requested in the motion to compel. The City does it, the County does
it, because a lot of time that is a - something that's easily obtained. And

but that

doesn't necessarily mean that it is always required in every case.
Rule 16 has those specific areas where - that require the prosecution to disclose evidence
and materials upon written request, and it has, you know, a list of things here.
When we have a DUI case where there's a breath test involved. Upon written request, the
defendant shall be permitted to inspect and copy or photograph any results of those tests.
But it doesn't necessarily mean that the prosecuting attorney has an affirmative duty to go
out and copy things and present thing to a lawyer who's representing a defendant. The
prosecutor's duty is to disclose what they have and anything that is within their
possession or control, or at their direction.
And here, a lot of things that are being requested are not within the City of Coeur
d' Alene's control.
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Moreover, there are method by which those items can be obtained from the Sheriff's
Department and not necessarily go through the Prosecutor's Office.

I don't find that the City Prosecuting Attorney, under the circumstances of this case, has
an affirmative duty to go and obtain all of those documents, since they're not within the
possession and control of the City, and then tum them over, so that they can be reviewed
by the defense.
Tr. p. 10, L. 2-25; p. 11, L. 1-9, p. 12, L. 13-18.
The Court then heard argument on the defense's Motion in Limine and heard the state's
Motion to Continue the defendant's Motion in Limine. The Court denied both motions, finding:
THE COURT: Well, the Court can forward on it, because I read it over and I understand
it. And I don't know that I need Mr. Johnston's testimony to deal with the issues that
have been raised by the defense here. And basically, it's more of a legal issue, as I
understand from reading Mr. Logsdon's supporting materials here, indicating that the
manual and the regulations relating to the administration of these breath tests now have
the - been modified a little bit, so that they're now kind of like recommendations as
opposed to standards, or standard operating procedures versus actual rigid standards that
need to be applied with in order to have these tests be admissible.

-4-

When I reviewed all of this over, it occurred to me that what this really comes down to is
challenging the reliability of the test results, as far as whether they should be admitted or
not. And that becomes a question of foundation at the trial.
And so, while I appreciate the motion in limine, it's one of those where I think the
objections need to be preserved at trial, if we are going to get into a battle over whether or
not those should be admitted, depending on the evidence that both sides seek to produce.
In the alternative, it becomes a question of weight of the evidence if the breath test result
does get admitted as to whether or not it's still reliable. And that's a question for the jury.
And so, the issues that have been raised here are certainly valid issues. You've made a
record on behalf of your client, Mr. Logsdon. But I'm gonna deny the motion in limine.
Tr. p. 15, L. 4-25, 16, L. 1-12.
The defense asked the Court for a ruling on whether the Court found that the Standard Operating
Procedures should have been promulgated under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. Tr. p.
16, L. 13-25, p. 17, L. 1-6. The defense further asked whether LC.§ 18-8004(4) was being
violated. Id. The Court responded that it was waiting to see what foundation for the breath test
results the state may lay at trial. Tr. p. 17, L. 7-12, L. 16-25, p. 18, L. 1-14.
Then, on March 21, 2013, the Court took a conditional plea of guilty to the driving under
the influence and without privileges charges. On April 29, 2013, the Court denied the
defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea finding in part:

-5-

THE COURT: [I]n this case, the limited knowledge of that McNeely [sic] case that Mr.
Logsdon has presented here, relate to a non-consensual blood draw. And the holding in
that case is none that really isn't all that surprising when you thank about it. They just
said that you can't force someone to donate blood or to give a blood sample against their
will. That's basically what it is. They have to get a warrant if you're gonna do that.
Your case is vastly different than that. And what the proposed motion here is, the
proposed tact is to - Mr. Logsdon was trying to argue in your behalf is basically challenge
the entire constitutionality of the implied consent arrangement that we have with the
driver's licenses and operate vehicles in the State ofidaho.
Well, that's the kind of motion that is not newly discovered, sort [sic] of speak, I mean it
could have been made at anytime as though cases have been working their way through
the various court systems throughout the Country challenging blood draws and things like
that.
And so, I don't find that the U.S. Supreme Court's intervening decision between now and
sentencing creates a just reason for to allow the plea to be withdrawn, to go back and
revisit something that could have been brought prior to the entry of the any of these pleas.
Tr. p. 71, L. 15-25, p. 72, L. 1-14.
The Court then sentenced the defendant but ordered parts of her sentence be stayed
pending the resolution of her appeal pursuant to I.C.R. 54.5. Tr. p. 79-88. The defendant timely
appealed.
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On October 9, 2013, the defendant appeared before the District Court on Appeal. The
Court found that the defendant's Motion in Limine was not properly preserved for appeal
because the Magistrate chose to decide it at trial, citing State v. Hester. The Court further found
that the situation presented in the defendant's proposed Motion to Suppress on the facts of her
case was too dissimilar to the facts in Missouri v. McNeely to find that the Magistrate had abused
his discretion in not allowing the defendant to withdraw her plea. The Court made no findings as
to the other points raised in the defendant's brief, but affirmed the Magistrate Court's orders and
denials on October 9, 2013. See Order on Appeal Sustaining Magistrate Court.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

The District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate's finding that a joint trial of a
driving without privileges offense with a driving under the influence offense
would not result in unfair prejudice to the defendant.

II.

The District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate's finding that the state had
not violated the defendant's constitutional rights by refusing to seek out various
documents and turn them over to the defendant per request.

III.

The District Court erred in finding that the defendant's Motion in Limine was not
properly preserved for appeal.

IV.

The Magistrate Court and District Court erred in not finding that no method for the
administration of evidentiary testing exists as required by I.C. § 18-8004 and
therefore the results of the evidentiary test must be excluded in this case.

V.

The District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate's finding that McNeely did
not create newly discovered law such that allowing the defendant to withdraw her
plea was just.

-8-

ARGUMENT
I.

A.

Introduction
The District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate's finding that joinder of a driving

without privileges charge and a driving under the influence charge was not prejudicial because of
the risk that the jury would believe that the defendant was the sort of person that ignores the law.
B.

Standard for Review
An appellate court exercises free review over questions oflaw. Idaho v. Button, 134

Idaho 814 (Ct.App.2000); Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 125 (Ct. App. 1997).
C.

The Magistrate Court failed to recognize that prejudicial joinder was a matter of law.
The Magistrate Court stated that "the Court has discretion on whether or not to separate

out or sever charges for separate trials." Tr. p. 2, L. 8-10. This is an incorrect statement of the
law. Rather, "the trial judge has a continuing duty at all stages of the trial to grant a severance if
prejudice does appear." State v. Cochran, 97 Idaho 71, 74 (1975). The burden to demonstrate
prejudice is on the defendant, and whether prejudice appears is a question oflaw. See id.; State v.
Eguilor, 137 Idaho 903, 908-09 (Ct.App.2002).
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D.

The Magistrate Court erred in finding that no unfair prejudice would result from the

joinder in this case.
Joinder of offenses is permissible if those offenses "could have been joined in a single
complaint, indictment or information." I.C.R. 13. Two or more offenses may be charged on the
same complaint, indictment or information when the offenses charged "are based on the same act
or transaction or on two (2) or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts
of a common scheme or plan." I.C.R. 8(a). Whether joinder is proper is "determined by what is
alleged, not what the proof eventually shows." Cochran, 97 Idaho at73.
The Magistrate Court found that the driving that took place was the same act. The Court
further found that there was not a danger that a jury would be moved to find the defendant guilty
of one of the charges in part based on their belief beyond a reasonable doubt that she was guilty
of the other.
The defendant argues that the Court must look at the Foutz test adopted by the Idaho
Supreme Court in State v. Abel,104 Idaho 864, 867 (1984):
Appellant relies upon United States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733 (4th Cir.1976)
(reversal of convictions of two bank robberies), as support for his argument that
the trial court erred in denying his motions for separate trials. The Foutz court
with respect to a motion for severance of counts which had been properly joined
as counts of the "same or similar character" stated that
"[w]hen two or more offenses are joined for trial solely on this theory, three
sources of prejudice are possible which may justify the granting of a severance
under Rule 14: (1) the jury may confuse and cumulate the evidence, and convict
the defendant of one or both crimes when it would not convict him of either if it
could keep the evidence properly segregated; (2) the defendant may be
confounded in presenting defenses, as where he desires to assert his privilege
- 10 -

against self-incrimination with respect to one crime but not the other; or (3) the
jury may conclude that the defendant is guilty of one crime and then find him
guilty of the other because of his criminal disposition."
Id. citing Foutz 540 F.2d at 736 (footnotes omitted); Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 88

(D.C.Cir.1964) (reversal of convictions of robbery and attempted robbery); 1 C. Wright, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 222 at 778-79 (1982). While the Foutz test states it is
adopted for cases where counts are properly joined for being of the "same or similar character,"
the analysis is the same for all severance motions. See Eguilor, 137 Idaho at 908-09.
In this case, there was a grave risk that the jury may find that the defendant, being the
"type" of person who ignores license suspensions, would also be the type of person who would
drive while intoxicated. This would be propensity evidence of the character trait of being the
type of person who ignores the law, and finding of guilt on the driving under the influence charge
would be erroneous.
While it is true that the Court must presume that juries will follow instructions, the Court
is also aware that realistically there are situations where that is impossible. See Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,226 (2010) (error can still affect

the outcome of trial even with curative instruction having been given); State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho
747, 751 (Ct.App.1997). There is no reasonable possibility that a trial in this matter would not
have ended with the prosecution arguing that the defendant was driving illegally, both without a
license and while intoxicated. The obvious and inescapable inference to draw is that the
defendant does not care to follow the laws and must be punished. The defendant should not have
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to proceed to trial to prevent this clearly prejudicial presentation of the charges take place. The
danger was clear, and the Magistrate Court should have prevented it.
Therefore, due to the risk that the jury will think the one crime is proof of a sort of the
other, the denial of the Motion to Sever was in error and would have resulted in an unfair trial in
violation of the defendant's right to Due Process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution.
This Court should reverse the finding of the lower Court and remand with instructions to
grant the motion to sever the charges.
II.
A.

Introduction
The District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate's finding that no violation of the

defendant's right to Due Process when the prosecutor did not seek out possibly exculpatory
evidence to review and refused to provide copies to the defendant.
B.

Standard of Review
An appellate court exercises free review over questions oflaw. Button, 134 Idaho 814;

Powell, 130 Idaho at 125.
C.

The review and delivery of plainly possibly exculpatory evidence from the state to the
defendant is mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I§ 13 of the

Idaho Constitution require that the defendant be provided with possibly exculpatory evidence.
- 12 -

Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and its progeny, the prosecution is bound to
disclose to the defense prior to trial all material exculpatory and impeachment evidence known to
the state or in its possession, United States v. Bagley, 4 73 U.S. 667, 676 ( 1985), so as to promote
truth and ensure that only the guilty are convicted. State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 433
(Ct.App.1994).
Though true that the federal Constitution does not require the state to provide
impeachment evidence prior to a guilty plea, Brady and its progeny are made utterly ineffectual if
the state is allowed to simply bury its head in the sand and not review the evidence upon which
its case relies. See Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 64 (2004). The law holds prosecutors with
power over the liberty and lives of their fellow citizens at least as accountable as it does dealers
in foodstuffs. See Simchick v. L M Young & Co., 47 A.D.2d 549, (N.Y.1975) citing Wiedeman

v. Keller, 49 N .E. 210 (Ill.1897) ("The law imposes a heavy burden on dealers in foodstuffs or on
items dealing with food products, and a dealer cannot, like the ostrich, bury his head in the sand
and so consider that he has insulated himself against liability. The doctrine is founded upon a
principle of public policy.").

D.

The Magistrate Court erred in finding that because the City Prosecutor did not have
possession of the plainly possibly exculpatory evidence, it was sufficient to require the
defendant to subpoena it.
The Magistrate Court found:

- 13 -

I don't find that the City Prosecuting Attorney, under the circumstances of this case, has
an affirmative duty to go and obtain all of those documents, since they're not within the
possession and control of the City, and then tum them over, so that they can be reviewed
by the defense.

Tr. p. 12, L. 13-18.
Binding precedent does not hold that a prosecutor need only tum over materials in the possession
of that office, but rather all those "known to the state or in its possession." Bagley, 473 U.S. at
676. Thus, the prosecutor may not say, as in this case, that the documents are available at the
Sheriffs Office or with some other executive agency. Tr. p. 6-9. The prosecutor, on the contrary,
has a duty to collect the evidence upon which the state plans to rely and ensure that it is not
seeking to convict the innocent. See State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463,469 (2007) (prosecutor
must ensure jury receives only competent evidence); I.R.P.C. 3.8.
Further, though it is true that neither I.C.R. 16 nor LC. § 19-1309 require the delivery of
the documents requested in this case to the defendant, the Court should bear in mind that the law
has remained unchanged since 1969 when it was passed. Today, technology is readily available
and in the possession of the state that allows for the easy copying and transmission of documents.
The discovery rules and law in criminal trials likely differs from civil cases which allow for a
much wider scope of discovery because of the concern that defendants would overly burden the
state. See Aeschliman v. State, 13 2 Idaho 397 ( 1999) (explaining the restraints placed on
discovery in post-conviction relief). However, it makes little sense for the state to complain that
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it would be an undue burden for the prosecutor to tum over what is in the possession of the
Sheriff, for in either case, it will be the state that provides the documents. Rather, the state's
insistence on forcing the defendant to hunt for and subpoena the various documents places an
unnecessary burden on the defendant's counsel. As the Court in Aeschliman conceded, most
defendants are indigent, and it is highly likely then that a public defender, saddled with a case
load far in excess of American Bar Association standards, will be forced to create and issue these
subpoenas and ensure that they are followed in dozens and dozens of cases at a time. The
situation is simply not workable, and threatens the effectiveness of the attorney provided at
public cost. The documents requested in this case are of a type to be likely required in the more
than one case, and it would impose little burden on the prosecutor to have a copy on hand to
review and provide defendants when the need arises. See Tr. p. 6-9. Therefore, it is a violation of
the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel and due process for the state to refuse to
provide copies of the documents requested in this case.
This Court should therefore reverse the finding of the Magistrate Court and remand with
instructions to enter an order compelling the requested information and to consider what
sanction, if any, is appropriate.
III.

A.

Introduction
The District and Magistrate Courts erred in not finding that a violation ofl.C. § 18-

8004(4) would prevent the admission of breath test results because the statute plainly requires
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that a method exist for the testing of breath. Further, the Court erred in not making a finding as
to whether a method existed; however, this Court may resolve that issue at the appellate level.
B.

Standard of Review
An appellate court exercises free review over questions oflaw. Button, 134 Idaho 814;

Powell, 130 Idaho at 125.
C.

The District Court should have decided the issue.
The Magistrate Court incorrectly held that the improper promulgation of a method for

evidentiary testing by the Idaho State Police pursuant to LC. § 18-8004(4) would not require the
exclusion of the evidence. In turn, the District Court found it could not answer whether it found
that a method existed or not. This is contrary to controlling law on the subject. The Court of
Appeals held in Johnson v. Emerson, 103 Idaho 350, 353-54 (1982), that a trial court may not
force the parties to wait till the middle of trial to learn the court's decision on a Motion in
Limine. Further, the Court held that in such a case the reviewing court could decide the issue the
lower court had erroneously refused to reach. Id.
The District Court relied on the holding in State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688 (1988),
incorrectly interpreting the opinion as the ruling law and being more similar to this case due to
being a Supreme Court case and a criminal case. However, the holding in Hester, if it was a
holding,2 was:

2 The holding on the issue was "for guidance" according to the Court and did not factor into the outcome. Hester,
114 Idaho at Thus, as it was not controlling it is without precedential value. See State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69,
305 P.3d 513,518 (2013).
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The motion in limine in the instant case was not denied by the trial judge. Hence,
the holding in [Davidson v. Beco Corp., 112 Idaho 560 (Ct.App.1986)] is not
determinative of the issue. Where no advance ruling has been obtained, counsel
must continue to object as the evidence is presented. Because a motion in limine is
based on an alleged or anticipated factual scenario, without the benefit of all the
other actual evidence which will be admitted at trial, the trial judge will not
always be able to make an informed decision regarding the admissibility of the
evidence prior to the time the evidence is actually presented at trial. It is often
difficult, and sometimes impossible, for the trial judge to make a proper ruling
without the benefit of all the other evidence admitted at trial. There may also be
difficulties in making an adequate record of the proposed evidence during pretrial
proceedings. In short, motions in limine seeking advanced rulings on the
admissibility of evidence are fraught with problems because they are necessarily
based upon an alleged set of facts rather than the actual testimony which the trial
court would have before it at trial in order to make its ruling. The trial judge, in
the exercise of his discretion, may decide that it is inappropriate to rule in advance
on the admissibility of evidence based on a motion in limine, but may defer his
ruling until the case unfolds and there is a better record upon which to make his
decision. In such an event, a litigant who has made a motion in limine requesting
advance rulings on the admissibility of evidence must continue to assert his
objections as the evidence is offered or his objections are not preserved.
Otherwise a party could make a blanket motion in limine prior to trial and then be
relieved of any obligation to object as the evidence unfolds at trial. However, we
continue to adhere to the holding in Davidson v. Beco Corp., supra, that if the
motion in limine is made, and the trial court unqualifiedly rules on the
admissibility or inadmissibility of the evidence prior to trial, no further objection
at trial is required in order to preserve the issue for appeal.
Accordingly, questions regarding the admissibility of Brian's hearsay statements
to Sorini have not been preserved for appeal. Workman Family Partnership v. City
of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32 (1982).
Therefore, the Court's holding Hester does not contradict the holding in Emerson. The question
should have been whether the Magistrate properly recognized that the evidence may affect the
outcome of the Motion. Here, the Magistrate found the opposite, stating that it was simply a
legal issue. Despite the Magistrate's holding he refused to rule on the issue, presumably
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believing that a total lack of method in violation of LC.§ 18-8004 does not require exclusion of
evidentiary test results. This Court should uphold the ruling in Emerson that where a trial court
refuses to decide a legal issue in a Motion in Limine prior to trial, that issue may be decided on
appeal. Further, where the issue is preserved for appeal through a conditional plea so that no trial
occurs as in Emerson or Hester where counsel fails to raise the objection, the claim that
somehow the issue is not properly preserved flies in the face of the spirit of I.C.R. 11.
D.

This Court should hold that no method exists and therefore the result of the evidentiary
test must be excluded.
Therefore, this Court should consider that Idaho Code 18-8004(4) mandates that testing

for alcohol concentration be done in accordance with methods approved by the Idaho State
Police. In supposed compliance with that mandate and authority, the Idaho State Police has
issued both "Standard Operating Procedures: Breath Alcohol Testing," ("SOP" or "SOPs")
(available at http://www.isp.idaho.gov/forensics/index.html) which purports to establish
procedures for the maintenance and operation of breath testing equipment as well as training and
operations manuals ("manual" or "manuals") (also available at
http://www.isp.idaho.gov/forensics/index.html) for the various breath testing devices, including
the Intoxilyzer 5000EN device used in this case.
The ISP, by using SOPs in the place of regulations, has made an end-run around the
requirements of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, specifically LC. §§ 67-5220 - 67-5232
and I.D.A.P.A. 44.01. The ISP promulgated 11.03.01.014.03, which merely states that breath
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tests shall be in conformity with standards established by the ISP. Thus, the various changes the
ISP makes to its breath testing procedures receive no public scrutiny prior to implementation,
which files in the face of what the legislature had in mind in passing I.C. § 18-8004(4). Under
the statutory definition, an agency action is a rule if it (1) is a statement of general applicability
and (2) implements, interprets, or prescribes existing law. See Tomorrow's Hope, Inc. v. Idaho

Department of Health and Welfare, 124 Idaho 843,846 (1993). The Idaho Supreme Court
considers the following characteristics of agency action indicative of a rule: (1) wide coverage,
(2) applied generally and uniformly, (3) operates only in future cases, (4) prescribes a legal
standard or directive not otherwise provided by the enabling statute, ( 5) expresses agency policy
not previously expressed, and (6) is an interpretation of law or general policy. Asarco

Incorporated v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 723 (2003). The standard operating procedures for
breathalyzer testing promulgated by the Idaho State Police easily fits this definition of a rule.
A comparison of the Idaho Supreme Court's analysis in Asarco with LC.§ 18-8004(4)
and the Idaho State Police's Standard Operating Procedures shows that the SOPs are rules that
fall under the IAP A.

I. The TMDL has wide coverage. The TMDL applies to all current and future
dischargers in a specific water body, in this case, the Coeur d'Alene River Basin.
Thus, the TMDL is accurately described by the trial court as applying to "a large
segment of the general public rather than an individual or narrow select group."
Asarco, 138 Idaho at 723. In this case, the SOPs apply to all breath testing that takes
place in the state of Idaho and thus to the entire driving population in the state. The scope
of the SOPs easily meets this requirement.
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2. The TMDL is applied generally and uniformly. While the TMDL has
characteristics that are both generally applicable and discharger specific, the
TMDL, on the whole, is more appropriately described as generally applicable.

The TMDL, in part, constitutes a numerical limit or budget for a given water
body, based on the sum of the allowable pollution from all identified point source
and nonpoint sources of pollution, as well as natural background levels of the
pollutant. LC. § 39-3602(27); 40 CFR 130.2(i). These sums are based on
individual determinations, referred to as load allocations (LA's) and wasteload
allocations (WLA's ). LA's are defined as the "portion of a receiving water's
loading capacity that is attributed either to one of its existing or future nonpoint
sources of pollution or to natural background sources." 40 CFR 130.2(g). The
wasteload allocations (WLA's) represent the "portion of a receiving water's
loading capacity that is allocated to one of its existing or future point sources of
pollution." 40 CFR 130.2(h). The federal regulations further describe the WLA's
as "a type of water-quality based effluent limitation." Id. In addition, the EPA has
used these individualized load allocations as enforceable limits modifying the
Mining Companies' NPDES permits accordingly. Thus, focusing on the LA and
WLA determinations alone, the TMDL process appears to be discharger specific.
Nevertheless, the individual LA and WLA determinations are just a small part of
the entire TMDL process. First, the TMDL considers the LA and WLA allocations
in sum in order to determine an over-all effluent limitation budget for the
identified water body. This budget applies to all existing and future point and
nonpoint source dischargers in a general and uniform manner. Second, the TMDL
process outlined by Idaho statute includes the following additional qualitative and
quantitative determinations:
(1) Identification of pollutants impacting the water body;
(2) An inventory of all point and nonpoint sources of the identified pollutant ... ;
(3) An analysis of why current control strategies are not effective in assuring full
support of designated beneficial uses;
(4) A plan to monitor and evaluate progress toward water quality progress and to
ascertain when designated beneficial uses will be fully supported;
(5) Pollution control strategies for both nonpoint and point sources for reducing
those sources of pollution;
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(6) Identification of the period of time necessary to achieve full support of
designated beneficial uses; and
(7) An adequate margin of safety to account for uncertainty.
I.C. § 39-3611. Clearly these procedures are generally and uniformly applicable
and require DEQ to focus on the waterbody as a whole, as opposed to the
individual sources of pollution. Therefore, for the above reasons, even though the
TMDL involves determinations of specific applicability, the over-all scheme
demonstrates the TMDL is more appropriately described as generally and
uniformly applicable.
Id. at 723-34. The method required by I.C. § 18-8004(4) is intended by the legislature to act as

gatekeeper for the introduction of breath test results in DUI cases. LC. § 18-8004(4) explicitly
requires courts to allow the introduction of the breath test results as long as the method is
-followed in spite of the rules of evidence. The procedures are meant to be "generally and
uniformly applicable" so as to guarantee accuracy. See Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation
Department, 148 Idaho 378, 387 (2009) (Wheeler, J. dissenting) citing Statement of Purpose, HB

284 (RS 13389) (1987).
3. The TMDL Operates Only in Future Cases. The TMDL operates only
prospectively and does not adjudicate past actions by the Mining Companies or
any other party.
Id. at 724. The method that the Idaho State Police must adopt is not retroactive.

4. The TMDL Prescribes a Legal Standard Not Provided by the Enabling Statute.
As described above, the TMDL constitutes a numerical limit on the total
allowable discharge in a specified waterbody. This limit is allocated between
point sources and nonpoint sources of pollution. Even ifDEQ does not intend to
enforce these limitations, and this Court is not determining whether or not it may
properly do so, EPA considers these numbers binding and has already used the
TMDL in order to reduce the discharge limits reflected in several of the Mining
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Companies' NPDES permits. Thus, the TMDL in fact contains quantitative legal
standards not provided by either the Clean Water Act or the Idaho Water Quality
Act.

Id The legislature requires the Idaho State Police to define a method. I.C. § 18-8004(4). That
method creates a legal standard preventing the Court from requiring the state to provide an expert
to establish a reliable and accurate breath test. Id Therefore, the method is a legal standard not
provided by LC. § 18-8004(4).
5. The TMDL Expresses New Agency Policy. Even if the TMDL is nothing more
than a planning tool, as DEQ argues, it is an expression of agency policy not
previously addressed. This is true not only of the numerical limits contained in the
TMDL, but also the additional requirements contained in the Idaho Water Quality
Act, including (1) the analysis of why current control strategies are not effective in
assuring full support of designated beneficial uses; (2) the plan to monitor and
evaluate progress toward water quality progress and to ascertain when designated
beneficial uses will be fully supported; and (3) the identification of pollution
control strategies for both nonpoint and point sources for reducing those sources
of pollution. LC.§ 39-3611.

Id. at 724-25. The method adopted by the Idaho State Police in its Standard Operating
Procedures is policy inasmuch as it establishes requirements, parameters, and guidance for police
officers performing breath testing.
6. The TMDL Implements and Interprets Existing Law. While DEQ argues the
TMDL implements the water quality standards, which constitute a rule as opposed
to a law, the TMDL actually implements and interprets the directives contained in
both the Clean Water Act, as well as the more specific Idaho Water Quality Act.
The central problem with DEQ's argument is the state water quality standards do
not provide all of the information or direction necessary for promulgating a
TMDL. While the water quality standards serve as a basis for the TMDL
calculations, the TMDL requires much more. Under the Idaho Water Quality Act,
not only must DEQ identify the pollutants and inventory point and nonpoint
sources of pollution, the agency must also analyze why current control strategies
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are not effective and develop new pollution control strategies for point and
nonpoint sources of pollution. I.C. § 39-3611. In addition, the Idaho Water
Quality Act requires DEQ to allocate effluent limitations among point and
nonpoint sources of pollution and develop planning processes to monitor and
evaluate progress. Id. In making these types of decisions, DEQ is working far
outside the scope of the water quality standards alone and is both implementing
law and creating policy. Thus, DEQ's argument that the TMDL implements a rule
as opposed to a law is unpersuasive.

Id. Unlike in Asarco, there is no colorable argument that the Idaho State Police are not
implementing and interpreting I.C. § 18-8004(4). The legislature required the ISP to adopt a
method that would act as a guarantor of admissibility in a criminal trial, and the ISP has
acknowledged that the SOPs are its attempt to do so. See IDAPA 11.03.01.014.03.
Further, the Court of Appeals acknowledged in Wanner v. State Dept. o/Transp., 150
Idaho 164 (2011), that hearings held per I.C. § l 8-8002A are agency action controlled by
IDAPA. It is difficult to understand how the hearings provided are agency action but the
methods and rules required are not agency action falling under the requirements of IDAP A.
Therefore, this Court must come to the same conclusion as the Supreme Court in Asarco:
In conclusion, the district court correctly determined the establishment of the
TMDL involved "rulemaking." Furthermore, because the TMDL is properly
considered a rule, it is invalid pursuant to the IAP A.
The IAPA provides, "[a] temporary or final rule adopted and becoming effective
after July 1, 1993, is voidable unless adopted in substantial compliance with the
requirements of this chapter." I.C. § 67-5231. It is undisputed that DEQ did not
comply with formal rulemaking requirements. Rather than arguing it had
substantially complied with the rulemaking requirements, DEQ argued it did not
have to do so. Thus, the district court correctly held the TMDL is void for failure
to comply with state administrative law.

Asarco, 138 Idaho at 725. The ISP's SOPs are void. As such, no method exists and the ISP has
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failed to comply with the legislature's requirements under I. C. § 18-8004(4 ). Though the Court
of Appeals has held that where the method is not complied with an expert may be called to
establish reliability, where no method exists at all, reliability cannot be established. State v.
Healy, 151 Idaho 734, 737 (Ct.App.2011). This is both because the legislature has fixed the
admissibility requirements for breath tests and made them conditional on the existence of a
method, and because the Court cannot find reliability exists where the agency responsible for
establishing a method refuses to do so, ostensibly to take advantage of the fact that few
defendants can afford an expert and the ISP's expert will be able to convince any court to
introduce the breath test results.
This Court should so hold and remand this case with instructions to exclude the breath
test results in this case.

IV.
A.

Introduction
The District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate's denial of the defendant's Motion

to Withdraw her guilty plea because McNeely changed Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in a
fashion that affected the validity of Idaho's warrantless breath testing and implied consent
scheme and the defendant should have been given a chance to raise the issue.

B.

Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews a denial of a motion to withdraw a plea for abuse of

discretion." Zepeda v. State, 152 Idaho 710 (Ct.App.,2012).
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C.

An intervening change in law is sufficient to allow the defendant to withdraw her plea.
The granting or denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is within the discretion of the

trial court. Because I.C.R. 33(c) is the same as the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(d), the
Idaho Supreme Court has noted that "federal case law is both helpful and relevant to the
resolution of these issues." State v. Hawkins, 117 Idaho 285, 289 (1990). Idaho has therefore
adopted from federal case law that the defendant has the burden of proving the plea should be
allowed to be withdrawn, the standard of review is "abuse of discretion." Zepeda, 152 Idaho at
715; State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957 (Ct.App.1990) (citations omitted).
When the motion is made before sentencing, a defendant need only show a "just reason" to
withdraw the plea. I.C.R. 33(c ); State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 801 (1988). Nonetheless, even
when the motion is presented before sentencing, if it occurs after the defendant has learned of the
content of the PSI or has received other information about the probable sentence, the court may
temper its liberality by weighing the defendant's apparent motive. State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643,
647 (Ct.App.2004).
"The general rule is that an intervening change in governing law may operate as a fair and
just reason to withdraw a guilty plea." United States v. Ensminger, 567 F.3d 587, 594
(9th.Cir.2009) citing United States v. Knowles, 29 F.3d 947, 951-52 (5th Cir.1994) (holding that
conviction constituted plain error in light of a subsequent binding circuit opinion finding
unconstitutional the statute under which the defendant was convicted); United States v. Presley,
478 F.2d 163, 167-68 (5th Cir.1973) (holding that defendants should have been permitted to
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withdraw guilty pleas where an intervening Supreme Court decision interpreted the statute of
conviction in a manner that gave defendants a plausible factual defense).
The Magistrate Court in this case correctly recognized that an intervening change in the
law could provide a just reason to withdraw the conditional guilty plea entered. The Court,
however, found that the decision in Missouri v. McNeely, --- S.Ct.---, 2013 WL 1628934
(U.S.Mo. 2013), did not create any such intervening case law. The District Court agreed,
confining the import of McNeely to its facts: a warrantless blood draw. As will be explained
below, both courts' findings as to the importance and scope of the effect of McNeely were
mistaken, and therefore the denial of the defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea should be
reversed.
D.

The McNeely decision affects whether a valid consent can be produced after the Notice of
Suspension for Failure of Evidentiary Testing has been read to a citizen without the state
first obtaining a warrant.
The defendant bears the burden of showing why a warrant was required prior to a reading

of the Notice of Suspension for Failure of Evidentiary Testing (otherwise known as the ALS
form) and why consent given after a reading of that form to a breath test is invalid.
In Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (U.S.Mo. 2013), the Supreme Court of the
United States held that an officer's belief that a person is currently intoxicated and need to
conduct an evidentiary test before the alcohol in their system evaporates does not per se create
exigent circumstances that allow the officer to forego seeking a warrant.
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The state of Idaho, like the other forty-nine states, has adopted what is called an implied
consent law. McNeely, supra, at 1566-67. In Idaho, implied consent means that a person who has
accepted the privilege of operating a motor vehicle upon Idaho's highways, provided that
evidentiary testing is administered by a peace officer with reasonable grounds for suspicion of
DUI, will physically consent to an evidentiary test. See State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 712
(Ct.App.2008); LC. § 18-8002(1). Implied consent is unrelated to and occurs after the warrant
required under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I§ 17 of the
Idaho Constitution. See State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 372-374 (1989). However, because it
was erroneously held by the Idaho Supreme Court that no warrant was required in a DUI case,
the warrant issue has long been overlooked. See id.
The relevant text of Woolery will be reproduced below:
As explained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Zielke, 137 Wis.2d 39,
403 N.W.2d 427 (1987), "the implied consent law is an important weapon in the
battle against drunk driving in this state. Neither the law, its history nor common
sense allows this court to countenance its use as a shield by the defense to prevent
constitutionally obtained evidence from being admitted at trial." 403 N.W.2d 427,
434.
The South Dakota Supreme Court ruling in State v. Buckingham, 240 N.W.2d 84
(1976), that noncompliance with the implied consent statutes rendered the blood
sample and test results inadmissible in a driving while intoxicated manslaughter
prosecution, was overruled just one year later in State v. Hartman, 256 N.W.2d
131 (S.D.1977). The court explained:
The Buckingham decision was without the benefit of argument from the state on
the question of whether use of the "exclusionary rule" was necessary where there
is a violation of the implied consent statutes. Upon further consideration, this
court feels that it is necessary to modify the Buckingham decision .... Our
consideration of the implied consent statutes must be prefaced upon the United
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States Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber v. California [citations omitted in
quote] ... The exclusionary rule is a judicially created means of protecting the
rights of citizens under the Fourth Amendment and Art. VI,§ 11 of the South
Dakota Constitution as a deterrent to unlawful police conduct. However, evidence
obtained in violation of statutory rights is not inadmissible per se unless the
statutory rights are of constitutional proportions or there exists no other method of
deterring future violations of the rights which the legislature has granted to its
citizens.

Hartman, 256 N.W.2d 131, 134-135. In holding that the results of the blood test
were admissible, the court explained that despite the fact the legislature created
a specific right of a driver to refuse to submit to a test to determine the
alcohol content of his blood, failure to comply with the procedure as set forth
in the implied consent statutes does not require suppression of the test results
as long as the testing procedure complied with the driver's constitutional
rights. [emphasis added].
The Idaho Legislature has acknowledged a driver's physical ability to refuse to
submit to an evidentiary test, but it did not create a statutory right for a driver to
withdraw his previously given consent to an evidentiary test for concentration of
alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances. [emphasis in original].
Importantly, the pre-1983 statute, I.C. § 49-352, covering implied consent to
extract blood for a blood alcohol test, stated: "If such person having been placed
under arrest and having thereafter been requested to submit to such chemical test
refuses to submit to such chemical test the test shall not be given but the
department shall suspend his license or permit to drive .... " The 1984 legislature
repealed LC. § 49-352, the legislative precursor of§ 18-8002, and adopted§ 188002 as a part of the new chapter 80 of title 18. In addition to maintaining the pre1983 implied consent language and the 1983 deletion of the language just
discussed, this enactment added a section making it clear that a driver does not
have the right to consult with an attorney before submitting to an evidentiary test.
The state submits that the elimination of the statutory provision that the test shall
not be given if it is refused, the continued use of the pre-1983 implied consent
language, the addition of a specific statutory provision making it very clear that a
driver does not have a right to consult with an attorney before submitting to the
evidentiary test, along with the statement of purpose enacted as a part of the 1983
Act, reflect the legislative "get tough" policy. This legislative "get tough" policy
did not include the creation of a statutory right for a driver to refuse to submit to
an evidentiary test requested by an officer who has reasonable cause to believe
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that such driver is under the influence.
The Oregon Supreme Court in State v. Newton, 636 P.2d 393 (1981), explained
that the concept of implied consent is a statutory fiction which, at first, appears to
be theoretically contradictory[:]
The contradiction disappears, however, when it is realized that the words
"consent" and "refusal" are not used as antonyms, because they are not used in the
same sense. "Consent" describes a legal act; "refusal" describes a physical reality.
By implying consent, the statute removes the right of a licensed driver to lawfully
refuse, but it cannot remove his or her physical power to refuse. As another court
put it:
The obvious reason for acquiescence in the refusal of such a test by a person who
as a matter of law is "deemed to have given his consent" is to avoid the violence
which would often attend forcible tests upon recalcitrant inebriates.

It is firmly established that a drunken driver has no right to resist or refuse
such a test [citations omitted in quote]. [emphasis added]. It is simply because
such a person has the physical power to make the test impractical, and dangerous
to himself and those charged with administering it, that it is excused upon an
indication of his unwillingness .... Bush v. Bright, 264 Cal.App.2d 788, 790, 792,
71 Cal.Rptr. 123 at 125 (1968) (original emphasis).
Thus refusal as contemplated by the statute is something other than withholding of
consent because consent is legally implied. It is a refusal to comply with the
consent which has already been given as a condition of a license to drive. The
purpose of a warning of license suspension following a refusal ... is to overcome
an unsanctioned refusal by threat instead of force. It is not to reinstate a right to
choice, but rather to nonforcibly enforce the driver's previous implied consent.
636 P.2d 393 at 397-398 (original emphasis). See also State v. Hoehne, 78
Or.App. 479, 717 P.2d 237 (1986); State v. Spencer, 305 Or. 59, 750 P.2d 147
(1988); Pears v. State, 672 P.2d 903 (Alaska App.1983), rev'd on other grounds,
698 P.2d 1198 (Alaska 1985); Wirz v. State, 577 P.2d 227 (Alaska 1978).
The Idaho Legislature has not created a statutory right to refuse to submit to an
evidentiary test to determine a driver's blood alcohol level. It is difficult to believe
that the Idaho Legislature would provide an individual with the statutory right to
prevent the state from obtaining highly relevant evidence when a law enforcement
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officer has reasonable cause to believe that individual has committed a crimewhether it would be driving under the influence, vehicular manslaughter, sale of
controlled substances, or murder. If the driver's constitutional right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures is complied with, the state should
not be prevented from obtaining such relevant evidence as the alcohol
content of the driver's blood. [emphasis added].
To put it more succinctly, the Court found that:
[i]n Schmerber,. the United States Supreme Court recognized that a warrantless
seizure of the blood of a driver, as long as probable cause exists and the
withdrawal of the blood is done in a reasonable fashion, does comply with the
provisions of the fourth amendment.

Id. at 374. However, the Idaho Supreme Court was manifestly wrong in its interpretation of
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) and has now been overruled by the United States
Supreme Court's ruling in McNeely. See McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1558-59. Therefore, a
warrantless evidentiary test in a DUI case is presumptively unconstitutional, and a person does
have the right to refuse to do the test unless and until a warrant has been secured or an exception
to the warrant requirement exists.
After Woolery, cases involving implied consent and the Fourth Amendment followed its
reasoning until Goerig v. State, 121 Idaho 26, 29 (Ct.App.1992) and State v. Nickerson, 132
Idaho 406 (Ct.App.1999). See State v. McCormack, 117 Idaho 1009 (1990); State v. Burris, 125
Idaho 289 (Ct.App.1994); Matter of McNeely, 119 Idaho 182 (Ct.App.1990). The Idaho Court of
Appeals in Nickerson misinterpreted Woolery as follows:
Nickerson's argument that his consent to the BAC at the police station was
involuntary is of no consequence because he had impliedly consented as a matter
of law. One who drives a motor vehicle on Idaho's highways is statutorily deemed
to have consented to an evidentiary test for blood alcohol concentration. Idaho
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Code§ 18-8002(1) provides that "[a]ny person who drives or is in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent
to evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol" if the test is administered at the
request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that the person has
been driving under the influence of intoxicants. By terms of this statute, anyone
who accepts the privilege of operating a motor vehicle upon Idaho's highways has
thereby consented in advance to submit to a BAC test. By implying consent, the
statute removes the right of a driver to refuse an evidentiary test. Hence, although
an individual has the physical ability to prevent a test, there is no legal right to
withdraw the statutorily implied consent.
132 Idaho at 410 citing Woolery, 116 Idaho at 372; Burris, 125 Idaho at 291; Goerig 121 Idaho at
29 (Ct.App.1992) ("By implying consent, the statute removes the right of a licensed driver to
refuse to take an evidentiary test; however, recognizing that some individuals may refuse to
comply with their previously given consent, the legislature provided an administrative process to
revoke those persons' licenses." citing Woolery, 116 Idaho at 3 73); McNeely, 119 Idaho at 187.
Nowhere in these opinions is there an explanation for how the Supreme Court in Woolery's
statement that no legal right exists to refuse an evidentiary test for alcohol in a DUI case and that
implied consent only dealt with the physical ability to refuse became confused for implied
consent itself taking away the legal right to refuse and a person having the physical ability to
refuse. Once the mistake was made, however, the courts cited it repeatedly until at last the
Supreme Court held it to be true in Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829 (2002). Indeed, the Supreme
Court of Idaho even cited to Nickerson as its only authority for the concept that implied consent
was consent to a Fourth Amendment search, sub silentio overruling its holding in Woolery. Id. at
833.
However, the Supreme Court's holding is manifestly wrong. The state does not have the
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power to require consent to a search in violation of the Constitution to use the road. Woolery, 116
Idaho at 372 quoting Hartman, 256 N.W.2d at 134-135. Certainly, it would be shocking that a
state legislature could do to drivers what it cannot do to prisoners. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517 (1984) ("We have repeatedly held that prisons are not beyond the reach of the Constitution.
No 'iron curtain' separates one from the other."). Rather than simply state that those who choose
to live in general population rather than solitary impliedly consent to random shakedowns, the
Court has held that prison regulations that inhibit rights are reviewed for their reasonableness.

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987). Once the Fourth Amendment was applied to the
states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), one would imagine the states did not retain the
ability to simply force their citizens to give up its protections whenever they pleased. The
Court's holding would allow the state to vary the protections of the federal Constitution in a
manner that hardly seems fitting to something titled "federal." As the federal Supreme Court
stated in Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) (footnote omitted) citing Atwater v. City of

Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-584 (1980); Boydv.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-627 (1886):
We are aware of no historical indication that those who ratified the Fourth
Amendment understood it as a redundant guarantee of whatever limits on search
and seizure legislatures might have enacted. The immediate object of the Fourth
Amendment was to prohibit the general warrants and writs of assistance that
English judges had employed against the colonists. That suggests, if anything,
that founding-era citizens were skeptical of using the rules for search and seizure
set by government actors as the index of reasonableness.
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Incorporating state-law arrest limitations into the Constitution would produce a
constitutional regime no less vague and unpredictable than the one we rejected in
Atwater. The constitutional standard would be only as easy to apply as the
underlying state law, and state law can be complicated indeed.
To the extent that the Supreme Court ofldaho has held that the state may force its citizens to
waive their federal constitutional rights to participate in something as universal as driving, it is
manifestly wrong. The Bill of Rights is a dead letter if the government it was designed to protect
its citizens from may simply waive it on a whim.

McNeely holds that it is not reasonable to search a driver's body for signs of intoxication
absent a warrant or when an exception to the warrant requirement applies. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at
1558-59. Therefore, the Court has reviewed the reasonableness of the warrantless evidentiary
test in DUI cases and indicated that the Constitution requires more than probable cause and the
withdrawal of blood being done in a reasonable fashion. Cf Woolery, 116 Idaho at 374. The
Constitution requires a warrant.
Further, the state may not punish a citizen for exercising or standing on their
constitutional rights. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000).
This Court must determine the validity of consent after a person has been read the Notice
of Suspension for Failure ofEvidentiary Testing (otherwise known as the ALS form) as it was at
the time of this incident. This form is read by Idaho police to defendants and states:
I have reasonable grounds to believe that you were driving or were in physical
control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other
intoxicating substances. You are required by law to take one or more
evidentiary test(s) to determine the concentration of alcohol or presence of drugs
or other intoxicating substances in your body. After submitting to the test(s) you
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may, when practical, at your own expense, have additional test(s) made by a
person of your own choosing. You do not have the right to talk to a lawyer before
taking any evidentiary test(s) to determine the alcohol concentration or presence
of drugs or other intoxicating substances in your body. [emphasis added].
The form goes on to list a litany of punishments that will result if a person refuses, including loss
of their driver's license and a fine. The obvious problem with this warning is that the law
requiring those tests is unconstitutional until the officer has secured a warrant or has a valid
exception to the warrant requirement. A state may not pass a law that visits penalties upon a
citizen for exercising a constitutional right. See Camara v. Municipal Court of the City And

County ofSan Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 531-534 (1967) (striking down laws that allow for fines
when individuals refuse to consent to warrantless searches of their dwellings); Columbia Basin

Apartment Association v. City ofPasco, 268 F.2d 791, 797-798 (9th.Cir.2001) (plaintiff tenants
have standing to challenge ordinance requiring tenants to allow warrantless searches of their
homes or face eviction); Wilson v. City of Cincinnati, 346 N.E.2d 666 (Ohio 1976) (striking
down ordinance requiring seller of a house to consent to a warrantless search or face a fine
between $5 and $500 because it coerced a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights). An officer may
not threaten to do what he is not legally or constitutionally authorized to do. Bumper v. North

Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-550 (1968); State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 488-89 (2007). The
policeman's threat vitiates any consent. Id.
The United States Supreme Court ruled in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564
(1983), that a refusal was not being compelled because an officer could lawfully perform the
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search. The Court relied on Schmerber to reach that conclusion:
In contrast to these prohibited choices, the values behind the Fifth Amendment are
not hindered when the state offers a suspect the choice of submitting to the bloodalcohol test or having his refusal used against him. The simple blood-alcohol test
is so safe, painless, and commonplace, that respondent concedes, as he must,
that the state could legitimately compel the suspect, against his will, to accede
to the test. Given, then, that the offer of taking a blood-alcohol test is clearly
legitimate, the action becomes no less legitimate when the State offers a
second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making
that choice. Nor is this a case where the State has subtly coerced respondent into
choosing the option it had no right to compel, rather than offering a true choice.
To the contrary, the State wants respondent to choose to take the test, for the
inference of intoxication arising from a positive blood-alcohol test is far stronger
than that arising from a refusal to take the test.

Id. at 563-64 citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 (emphasis added). Naturally, this does not hold
true. The ruling in McNeely necessarily overruled this holding. An officer cannot lawfully force
a blood draw. He must seek a warrant or be able to point to exigent circumstances. Despite this
contradiction, the Supreme Court wrote in dicta in McNeely that the state could still rely on
implied consent and that refusals may be used against them because they do not violate the Fifth
Amendment, specifically citing Neville. See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1566. This dicta does not
save Neville. Since the officer cannot warrantlessly force a evidentiary testing, the state is
coercing the respondent into choosing an option it has no right to compel.
Article I Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution affords greater protection than the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution based upon the long-standing jurisprudence of the
Idaho appellate courts, the uniqueness of the State ofldaho, and the uniqueness of the Idaho
Constitution. See State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 995 (1992) (not the exclusionary rule, but the
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constitutional provision itself impedes fact-finding function of Court- but this is a "price the
framers anticipated and were willing to pay"); State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746 (1988)
(Idahoans have a higher expectation of privacy in the home); State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387
(1981) Gudicial integrity mandates exclusionary rule); State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586 (1978)
(admission of illegally seized evidence itself a violation of constitution); State v. Arregui, 44
Idaho 43 (1927) (application of exclusionary rule in Idaho 34 years prior to Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961)); State v. Cada, 129 Idaho 224 (Ct.App.1996) (Idahoans have higher expectation
of privacy in their land). Thus, the results of the breath test, because they were taken in violation
of Article I § 17, must be excluded at trial.
In this case, the defendant was read the ALS form without a warrant being secured.
Therefore, the consent given was invalid, and the results of the test should be suppressed. The
lower courts should have recognized that the McNeely holding was further reaching than forced
blood draws in states where implied consent does not exist, and should have found just cause to
withdraw the plea. This Court should reverse the denial of the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
and remand to allow the Motion to Suppress Breath Test to be heard.
CONCLUSION
The case before this Court requires it to determine how far the state may go in violating a
citizen's rights to prove a charge of Driving under the Influence. This Court should reverse the
lower Court's denial of the Motion to Sever, the Motion to Compel, the Motion in Limine, and
the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, and remand for further proceedings.
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